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In this policy brief, suitable strategies are recommended for communicating effectively toward different 
media (local, national, international, print, online, electronic) during conflict. According to INFOCORE’s prin-
ciples, this policy brief has been written for direct use by 
two key actor types, each of which plays a key role in 
managing violent and armed conflicts1: (1) NGOs and (2) 
political actors/authorities/institutions2 (particularly, 
the EU/EC and its international partners) active in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. 
(1) NGOs: Conflict-related news, intelligence and advo-
cacy relayed by NGOs play a crucial role in shaping the 
perceptions and actions of policy, military and non-governmental actors, especially inside conflict areas. 
Owing to their specialised knowledge of the situation, NGOs are key actors in conflicts. They are profes-
sional information brokers that use their own source networks to assist in dialogue, peace-building, conflict 
mediation and prevention. When interacting with various media, both at the grassroots level in conflict ar-
eas and in the international arena, they typically enjoy greater credibility and trust with journalists than po-
litical actors do. However, the number of NGOs has expanded exponentially during the last two decades, 
which has led to an increasingly fierce competition among NGOs for funding. As a result, NGOs are now 
more than ever competing for communicative sovereignty over (problem/issue) definition and resolution. 
Against this background, the purpose of NGOs’ media relations has expanded.  
(2) Political actors/authorities: Research shows that political actors/authorities help to produce conflict-
related news by communicating strategically with the media. They also shape the opportunity structures of 
journalists for war reporting and are exerting strong influence during conflict times – often attempting to 
instrumentalise the media for their own agendas. Through its treaties and strategic documents, the Euro-
pean Union (as a particular political actor) strongly emphasises the prevention of violent conflict and pro-
moting peace in Europe and beyond its borders (cf. Gothenburg Program 2001; Treaty of Lisbon 2009, 
Art10a). Its greatest strengths lie in its preventive approach and its reliance on non-military instruments. 
Against this backdrop, the media is particularly relevant for the EU, for at least two reasons: 
 First, the –– international and local –– media can play key roles in shaping dynamics on the ground 
and can thus be crucial to the failure or success of long-term peace-building and short-term instru-
ments such as mediation. Cooperating with media is a key component of successful conflict preven-
tion, resolution and peace-building policy initiatives. 
 Second, where and when the EU acts primarily depends on where member states decide to focus 
their attention and resources; this factor is influenced by mediated public debates. 
Both NGOs and the EU are cooperating with media, because they (rightly) assume that this is a key compo-
nent of successful conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building initiatives. Beyond this mutually 
shared aim, politicians want to be re-elected and NGOs are expanding the purpose of their media relations 
to ensure their continued existence and viability. 
 
BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 
Our recommendations for enhanced media communication of these two key actors are basing upon the 
following assumptions: (1) the transformation of the global media landscape (the rise of social media and 
new communication technologies, new non-Western transnational broadcasting, the precariousness of tra-
ditional journalism, the scarcity of resources in mass media in particular cutbacks to foreign correspond-
ents, and outsourcing production owing to dwindling advertising revenues, and NGOs and not-for-profit 
                                                          
1 For INFOCORE’s definition of conflict, see http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/def_conflict.pdf and  
http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/def_violent-conflict.pdf   
2 For INFOCORE’s definition, see http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/def_Strategic_Communicator-_-Strategic-
Communication.pdf 
 INTRODUCTION 
“Owing to the specifications in INFOCORE’s 
negotiated DoW, our recommendations in 
this policy brief must fit two very different 
communicating entities: NGOs and political 
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media seeking to fill the gap 3, etc.); (2) the changing 
nature of strategic communication4 worldwide (e.g. 
the massive increase in new forms of propaganda 
and disinformation as well as new forms of their dis-
tribution); (3) the changing nature of violent conflict 
(e.g. new issues are being contested by new actors 
with new tactics, the rise of terrorism). These three 
initial frame conditions mean that, today more than ever, security governance and related actions in the 
political field and the engagement of NGOs must include responsible, coherent and reliable public commu-
nication. Snow and Taylor (2006) describe the 21st century information environment as a space in which 
“truisms compete with alternative truths” and that for a truth to prevail, it must be perceived as more 
‘credible’ than its alternative (p. 406).5 This is why we consider evidence to be a key performance criterion 
for accurate conflict communication and thus as a core 
concept of all media-related communication by politi-
cal actors and NGOs in this field. Without evidence, the 
messages offered to the media by NGOs and political 
actors risk being perceived by journalists as merely a 
representation of particular interests or even as propa-
ganda. For NGOs, evidence has an even greater im-
portance: it is essential not only for advocacy towards 
political decision-makers and various publics but also 
towards donors. Evidence as a core concept of NGOs’ 
strategic media-related communication contributes to 
their continued existence and viability. 
 
Furthermore, research by INFOCORE (WP7)6 has shown that the qualities of available source materials in-
fluence journalists’ everyday practices and routines. Other research7 has shown that the qualities of media 
relations determine the power and success of political communication (for example, why and how the me-
dia adopt an NGO’s or a political actor’s communication input/standpoint). As a result, we made the quality 
of NGOs’ and political actors’ communication with media/journalists the focus of our recommendations for 
a professionalisation of their media relations.  
 
RESEARCH RESULTS: WP6 
(1) NGOs: Public discourse is a competitive evidence environment in which strategic communicators/actors 
compete for sovereignty over (problem/issue) definition and resolution. In these competitive evidence en-
vironments, the ‘evidence’ (= transparency of sources/origin) of media-related organisational communica-
tion and their ‘epistemic status’ (= transparency concerning the (un)certain status of an evidential claim)8 
are key criteria not only of their normative quality but also of their influence. The findings of our computer-
based content analysis (for methodological details, see the section on research parameters) showed that 
the normative quality of NGOs’ evidential claims – evaluated according to the quality and quantity of evi-
dence provision and the number of references to (un)certainty (epistemic status) – is by far the highest in 
the topical domain of violence/escalation. However, other NGO topics did not benefit from such a compara-
tively high normative quality in NGOs’ media-related communication. Further, local NGOs’ texts (compared 
                                                          
3 Otto & Meyer (2012). Missing the story? Changes in foreign news reporting and their implications for conflict prevention. Media, 
War & Conflict, 5, 205-221. 
4 For INFOCORE’s definition of strategic communication/communicator, see http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/02/def_Strategic_Communicator-_-Strategic-Communication.pdf 
5 Snow & Taylor (2006). The revival of the propaganda state: US propaganda at home and abroad since 9/11’. International Commu-
nication Gazette, 68, 389–407. 
6 Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Baden. (2016). Journalistic transformation. How source texts are turned into news stories. Journalism 
[Online First]. DOI: 10.1177/1464884916667873 
7 C.f. Fröhlich & Rüdiger (2006) Framing political public relations: Measuring success of political communication strategies in Ger-
many. Public Relations Review, 32, 18-25. 
8 For INFOCORE’s definition of evidential claim/belief, see http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/def_evidential-
beliefs.pdf  
“BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS I:  
► transformation of the global media landscape 
► changing nature of strategic communication 
worldwide 
► changing nature of violent conflict itself” 
 
“BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS II:  
► ‘Evidence’ = key performance criterion for 
the accuracy of conflict communication; as a 
result…  
► ‘Evidence’ = core concept of media-related 
communication by political actors and NGOs 
active in the field of conflict prevention, man-
agement and resolution.  
► WP6 puts the quality of NGOs’ and politi-
cal actors’ communication with media/jour-
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to texts of transnational NGOs (TnNGO)) generally contain lower shares of both epistemic statuses (cer-
tainty and uncertainty). Against the backdrop of Snow and Taylor’s notion of the credibility of truth (see 
above), these are problematic findings.  
According to our research results, NGOs’ media relations and public communication material especially 
needed improvement concerning indicating the sources of evidential claims (47% of all texts provide no 
source specification; results differ among NGO types 
and conflict types). This high share is disappointing. In 
our view, particularly NGOs must protect their sources 
under certain circumstances. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot provide any infor-
mation about where an evidential claim stems from or 
why an assumption, interpretation, etc. has been 
made. Thus, we strongly recommend that NGOs should 
improve the factual character of their communication 
on war and armed conflict, thereby avoiding the im-
pression that they somehow deal with factoids. This 
particularly applies to local NGOs compared to 
TnNGOs: First, local NGOs’ texts generally contain 
lower shares of evidence. Second, their texts also men-
tion explicit sources of evidence significantly less often 
than TnNGOs. The latter might have more (financial/human) resources available than local NGOs for inves-
tigation into the proof of their war-related and conflict-related claims. As a result, they might also be more 
assertive than local NGOs, which gives them more aplomb when dealing with uncertainty and relying on 
their role as experts. Since many TnNGOs target quality Western news media and therefore need to meet 
their normative expectations, resources, however, might only form part of the explanation. Talking of ‘un-
certainty’: To communicate an evidential yet uncertain claim while proactively admitting to uncertainty 
concerning this claim is considered a persuasive strength and contributes to a communicator’s general 
credibility.  
Our study also revealed that, in international press re-
ports9, seven out of the 10 most referenced NGOs in 
media are TnNGOs (the most successful being the Inter-
national Red Cross). Their overall better performance 
concerning evidence therefore pays off, with higher res-
onance quotas in international media, since our data 
shows a significant effect: the higher the provision of 
evidence in an NGO’s communication texts, the higher 
the number of references to it in international media 
coverage. For local media10 in conflict regions in which 
local NGOs are active (here, 50% of the 10 most refer-
enced NGOs are local NGOs), interestingly, there is no 
correlation (between provision of evidence in communi-
cation texts and the number of references in media cov-
erage). Thus, for the local media in our conflict regions, 
evidence in (media-related) communication material 
might be less important than for international media.  
According to our data, NGOs who produce more com-
munication do not automatically increase their media 
citation ratios in every conflict. Rather, our data allow 
                                                          
9 SZ, Welt, CNN, Al-Jazeera, NYT, BBC, RFI, Guardian, Daily Telegraph 
10 Israel Hayom, Haaretz, Al-Quds, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Enab Baladi, SANA, Dnevnik, Utrinski Vesnik, Koha Ditore, POLITIKA, Iwacu, 
Digital Congo 
“NGOs: Results I  
► 47% of all NGO texts provide no source 
specification; (results differ among NGO types 
and conflict types) 
► Local NGOs’ texts (compared to texts of 
TnNGOs) contain lower shares of evidence.  
► Local NGOs’ texts also mention sources of 
evidence significantly less often than trans-
national ones. 
► Local NGOs’ texts (compared to texts of 
TnNGOs) in general contain lower shares of 
epistemic statuses (certainty and uncer-
tainty).” 
“NGOS: Result II  
► Seven out of the 10 most referenced 
NGOs in media coverage are TnNGOs (the 
most successful being the International Red 
Cross).  
► The higher the provision of evidence in an 
NGO’s communication texts, the higher the 
number of references to the NGO in interna-
tional media coverage. 
► For local media (conflict regions), evi-
dence in communication material is less im-
portant than for international media. 
► Concerning international media, it pays 
off for NGOs to not communicate constantly, 
but to only do so when something very seri-
ous occurs. NGOs that operate according to 
this pattern receive better media resonance 
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for the following conclusion: Concerning international media, it pays off for NGOs not to communicate con-
stantly, but only to do so when something very serious occurs. NGOs that operate according to this pattern 
receive better media resonance than NGOs who produce a kind of ‘continuous static’. 
(2) Political actors/authorities/entities: For political actors, our analysis showed similar results. Overall, the 
data showed that, for both international and local media, political actors who were directly involved on the 
ground had higher impacts on the news coverage. This was unsurprising yet noteworthy. In addition, there 
were no significant differences in the overall impacts of politi-
cal communication between the conflicts. This means that the 
media is always open to political communication on conflicts, 
independent of the conflict context itself. Also, strategic com-
munication deriving from political entities had higher visibility 
than NGO communication. 
For international media, the primary predictors of political ac-
tors media resonance were the share of texts that contained 
evidence as well as – unlike for NGOs – the overall number of 
texts. The importance of the provision of evidence is again un-
derlined by a correlation between the number of texts distrib-
uted by the political actors and the share of texts that con-
tained evidence. It thereby remains unclear whether the num-
ber of texts influenced these communicators’ success or the 
fact that those who created more texts also had an overall 
higher level of provided evidence. However, for local media, 
the data offer a less clear picture. Here, the only relevant predictor of media resonance seems to be the 
number of distributed texts. This might mean that, in local media, factors that were not measured played 
important roles, for instance, trust in political communicators, political affiliation or established relations 
between journalists and politicians.  
(3) Gender-related findings: A further analysis of strategic persuasive texts in which male and female ex-
perts are explicitly represented/discussed/cited and/or which stem from those experts concentrated on the 
representation of the voices of women (in comparison to those of men). The analysis included more than 
23,000 texts distributed in English, French and German and stemming from about 260 different strategic 
communicators (including NGOs and political actors, but also beyond these two groups). The findings re-
vealed that the shares of female voices in strategic communication texts are extremely low for our two Afri-
can conflict cases: Burundi and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo. The extreme underrepresentation 
of female voices in strategic discourses in and 
about these two crisis cases can be seen regardless 
of the provenance/origin of the analysed texts (in-
ternational, EU, local communicators). This means 
that even strategic communicators with EU prove-
nance are marginalising voices of African women 
and elide female viewpoints in their respective 
media-related and public communication. Sine we 
can assume that the representation of women and the proportions seen in the communicative texts of stra-
tegic communicators are also diffused in media reports (when journalists use these texts as source mate-
rial), this is a problem, particularly in the context of war and armed conflict. So, the question arises 
“Political Actors: Results II  
► International media: The primary predictors of political actors’ media resonance were  
▪ the share of texts that contained evidence 
▪ the overall number of texts (unlike for NGOs!) 
► Local media: The only relevant predictor of media resonance seems to be the number of distributed 
texts. ( in local media, factors that were not measured might play a more important role, for instance, trust in 
political communicators, political affiliation or established relations between journalists and politicians).” 
 
“Gender-related Results:  
► Female voices in strategic communication texts 
are extremely low for our two African conflict 
cases Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo  
► The extreme underrepresentation and margin-
alisation of female voices in strategic discourses in 
these two crisis cases also applies to texts of stra-
tegic communicators with EU provenance.” 
 
“Political Actors: Results I  
► Political actors who were directly 
involved on the ground had higher 
impacts on news coverage. 
►Strategic communication deriving 
from political actors/entities had 
higher media visibility than NGO 
communication. 
► There were no significant differ-
ences in the overall impacts of politi-
cal communication between the six 
conflicts ( the media is open to politi-
cal communication on conflicts, independ-





- EUROPEANPOLICYBRIEF - P a g e | 6 
whether, in war and conflict reporting, the media picture is substantially determined by the content of stra-
tegic communications. In other words: is the inadequate representation of women in war and conflict cov-





Against the backdrop of these results and on the basis of our brief notes on the changing nature of public 
communication and discourse, as well as on the basis of general trends in the media landscape and journal-
ism, we will now provide specific recommendations for the professionalisation of NGOs’ and political ac-
tors’ strategies in the field of (de-escalative) conflict communication. Both strategic actor types can thereby 
enhance their credibility and the newsworthiness of their messages, ensuring better resonance quotas in 
media coverage. Concerning political actors, our recommendations don’t focus on the EU or on EU-related 
political actors only, nor are our recommendations based on any evaluation of existing communication 
strategies of the EU, for instance the work of The Strategic Communications Division (‘StratComms’)12 or 
the EU’s international efforts to counter propaganda and disinformation13.  
In the introduction, we talked about the necessity to consider responsible, coherent and reliable public 
communication as a substantial and integral part of security governance and related actions in the political 
field and the engagement of NGOs. This means anticipating, from the outset, the dramatically changing set-
ting of the emergence of public discourse and particularly the 
many new conditions under which media discourses arise to-
day. There are numerous examples of (political) actions and 
decisions that failed because complex discourse processes 
conveyed by the (mass) media were not considered. In this 
context, we speak of media autism.  
As a result, our recommendations here focus on a sustainable 
strategic concept and sustainable strategic measures for the 
professional planning of media-related communication activities beyond immediate specific coverage. We 
deliberately refrain from making recommendations on the fundamentals of good media relations; we as-
sume this knowledge is present; for instance, the fact that journalists always work under extreme time 
pressure, that they need stories that are very relevant to their readers, that they need perfect press re-
leases that meet their professional needs and not those of a strategic communicator, or that journalists 
                                                          
11 Fröhlich (2016). Gender, media and security. In P. Robinson, P. Seib, & R. Fröhlich (eds.), Routledge handbook of media, conflict 
and security (pp. 22-35). London, New York: Routledge. 
12 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/100/strategic-communications_en  
13 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578008/EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf  
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Security governance and related ac-
tions in the political field and the en-
gagement of NGOs must include (1) re-
sponsible, coherent and reliable public 
communication through (2) a sustaina-
ble strategic concept and sustainable 
strategic measures.” 
“Initial Recommendations (Summary):  
(1) NGOs and political actors/entities should improve the factual character of their communication on 
war and armed conflict, thereby avoiding the impression that they somehow deal with factoids. This 
particularly applies to local NGOs compared to transnational NGOs (TnNGO). 
(2) Concerning local media, NGOs and political actors/entities should improve their relationships with 
local media on the ground.  
(3) While constant communication pays off for political actors/entities, NGOs should not communicate 
constantly, but should save valuable resources for times when something (very) serious occurs. 
(4) NGOs and political actors/entities should be aware of the underrepresentation of women’s voices in 
media in general and in war and conflict coverage in particular. They should consider the proactive 
provision of female voices and women’s perspectives in their communication material to be a contribu-
tion to fair and balanced content production –– a key prerequisite for de-escalative effects of commu-
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typically need immediate and direct responses to media inquiries, that professional and strategic media re-
lations planning must clearly distinguish between the intended short-term and long-term effects of the 
communication and between different target audience types, including their subpublics, etc. We also re-
frain from suggestions concerning particular tactics or tactical concepts/measures. 14  
To further improve the media relations of NGOs 
and political actors, and to augment their exist-
ing communication strategies, this policy brief 
has two goals: First, to improve their profes-
sional relationship with journalists/media; sec-
ond, to improve the media resonance of their 
communication activities, facilitating the inser-
tion of dialogue-related and mediation-related content into mediated public discourse on war and armed 
conflicts. Here, the focus is on measures for the credibility of media relations and media-related communi-
cation (e.g. improving evidence, reliability, transparency, etc.). The latter is extremely important in today’s 
post-factual or post-truth era, in which information needs to be particularly credible and reliable in order 
to be selected by media/journalists for publication. 15  
The following suggestions refer partly to our empirical findings (see the Introduction) about the evidential 
character of NGOs’ and political actors’ communication (which requires improvement, as shown above), 
and partly incorporate key new general trends in media relations/PR and in journalism, which must be con-
sidered generally. 
To professionalise, increase efficiency, and improve the 
planning of organisational communication with media 
(representatives), especially during violent crises and 
armed conflicts, we recommend implementing convincing 
‘media relations governance’, that is, a sustainable, or-
ganisationally embedded regulatory framework for the 
strategic management of communication activities for and 
with media (representatives).  
Especially for crisis and risk scenarios, this means that strategic communication planning requires a strate-
gic regulatory framework (= media relations governance) that enables strategic communicators in NGOs 
and among political actors to get or develop the ability to plan and manage their communication work; for 
instance, to offer continuous and convincing evidence for their messages. In the light of journalists’ expec-
tations of valuable media relations, the media relations governance we recommend affords NGOs and po-
litical actors the maximum resource effectiveness and media resonance.  
For the principle of media relations governance we suggest for NGOs and political actors, we envisaged six 
so-called ‘Governing Elements (GE), drawn from the classic elements of general governance research16:  
a) Establishing and maintaining direct contact with media/journalists (e.g. proactive rather than reactive 
consultations/negotiations with journalists;17 exclusive informational events for selected journalists on 
highly specific topics/backgrounds; cooperation networks to avoid in-group/out-group dynamics)  
b) Continuous media monitoring (media system and media content) (= cost-intensive!) 
b.1) formative evaluation before and during communication, for process optimisation  
b.2) summative evaluation after the communication, to measure and optimise efficiency (‘return on in-
vestment’)  
                                                          
14 Tactic follows strategy; tactic = actual communicative acts; for instance, the tactical decision in a certain strategic framework of a 
given issue to rather have a press conference than an organisational video, etc. Tactical decisions can only be made on the basis of 
the particularities of an individual organisation/institution, its type (for example, thinking, doing, talking NGOs), aims, resources, 
communicative structure, target groups, problems, etc. There is no one-size-fits-all tactic. 
15 Harsin (2015). Regimes of posttruth, postpolitics, and attention economies. Communication, Culture & Critique, 8, 327–333. 
16 Enderlein et al. (Eds.). (2012). Handbook on Multi-level Governance. Northampton, MA: Elgar. 
17 For instance, in the framework of so-called ‘blaming and shaming’: Negotiations/Consultations about clearly problematic cases of 
escalating effects of media reporting on armed conflicts and crises. 
“Two general goals: (1) to improve the profes-
sional relationship with journalists/media; (2) to 
improve the media resonance of communication 
activities, facilitating the insertion of dialogue-re-
lated and mediation-related content into mediated 
public discourse on war and armed conflicts.” 
“General recommendation: Implementa-
tion of convincing ‘media relations govern-
ance’: A sustainable, organisationally em-
bedded regulatory framework for the stra-
tegic management of communication ac-
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c) Agreeing on and setting norms and values (benchmarks) in the organisation/institution and externally 
for dealing with media/journalists (e.g. in a mission statement; they might for instance include a com-
mitment to gender equity/gender-sensitive communication/reporting, etc.)  
d) Identifying and establishing best practice processes (see the detailed recommendations on selected 
professional processes, techniques, measures, etc. below) 
e) Convincing with credibility: creating and increasing trust via evidence and transparency (see the empiri-
cal findings of our work packages on ‘evidence’ and ‘epistemic status’ in the Introduction) 
f) Providing incentives for journalists (newsworthiness/news factors, exclusive information/access, re-
source effectiveness/compensation, specialised expertise, rapid reaction times, storytelling/narratives, 
gender-sensitive information/reporting, etc.).  
We will now recommend and describe specific best practice processes that appear prudent and necessary 
based on the findings in our Work Package (outlined above) and on new trends/developments in media re-
lations/PR, journalism and social media. 
 
 
PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF A BEST PRACTICE MODEL OF 
‘MEDIA RELATIONS GOVERNANCE’  
 
(1) COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND COHERENCE 
Following classic governance research, we recommend that those responsible for and participating in me-
dia relation/media-related communication come together with those responsible for and participating in 
crisis management on the basis of shared norms, values and/or interests in order to achieve the common 
goal to conceptualise and implement effective media relations governance (GE c). Norms, values and in-
terests should be regularly discussed and put to the test.  
The permanent and sustainable realisation of cooperation, coor-
dination and coherence (in particular) is very difficult to achieve 
in a multinational construct such as the EU (or transnationally 
operating NGOs). Strong sectionalisation and departmentalisa-
tion of policy-making appears to be the primary – probably even 
the single most important – obstacle to good media relations (fragmented communication, inconsistent 
messages, few transnational agendas, etc.). This is even more so considering the multi-layeredness of cur-
rent EU media relations communication at various levels, including NATO, the EU, its member states, and 
existing communicative partnerships with civil society organisations. In the light of this, even attempts and 
efforts must be considered successes. 
For the EU’s media-related communication, it is advisable to enter into strategic communication partner-
ships and cooperation networks with selected NGOs who achieve a high degree of credibility per se. The 
extent to which such NGOs are willing to enter into these partnerships and networks (not all will be) must 
be evaluated in individual cases. 
These strategic communication partnership types 
can be very helpful concerning timing communi-
cations (e.g. avoiding cannibalisation effects, am-
plifying effects with homogeneous messages) or 
when looking at the level/quality of evidence 
(NGOs used as sources of facts in media-related 
communication from political actors, and vice versa). Existing partnerships are a step in the right direction. 
They should be strengthened and extended. As organisations, NGOs have it easier than the EU concerning 
creating intra-organisational cooperation, coordination and coherence. However, for external inter-organi-
sational cooperation, coordination and coherence, there are likely to be similar problems, for instance ow-
ing to the competition among NGOs (e.g. for donors) or owing to a complex transnational structure. How-
ever, cooperation, coordination and coherence are not only key requirements for implementing a compre-
hensive media governance model, but also for producing and providing convincing evidence in media-re-
lated communication messages (GE e). For NGOs, we therefore recommend creating the best possible 
“Internal cooperation, coordination 
and coherence on the basis of shared 
norms, values and/or interests.” 
“External cooperation, coordination and coherence: 
Political actors   Implementing strategic commu-
nication partnerships and cooperation networks 
with selected NGOs on the basis of shared norms, 
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communicative evidence networks by means of external cooperation, coordination and coherence: This 
should be done via cooperation among NGOs (inter-organisational) and via continual involvement and inte-
gration of NGOs’ local partners and actors (extra-organisational) in compiling communicative evidence. We 
know that these partnership types already exist. However, from NGOs in other fields we know that these 
partnerships between NGOs are now under severe pres-
sure owing to the increasing competition between NGOs. 
Cooperative networks can also be helpful for NGOs and 
political actors when so-called in-group/out-group dy-
namics (GE a) arise: Local in-group audiences often reject 
information simply because it stems from foreign out-
group institutions, and vice versa. 18 To implement an 
agenda in public discourse or among political decision-
makers, it can also be helpful to create cooperative net-
works among like-minded local, national, international 
and transnational NGOs/political actors/journalists. 
These cooperative communication network types can 
overcome the disadvantages of the described ‘in-
group/out-group dynamics’ by targeting communication toward in-groups or out-groups, depending on the 
situation.  
Finally, NGOs’ and political actors’ processes of com-
piling communicative evidence via cooperation 
should consider cooperation with academics/scien-
tists (for instance, via joint regular round-tables). The 
media-related communication of NGOs and political 
actors should consistently (where suitable and avail-
able) employ scientific findings ─ for instance, ours 
concerning the fact that evidence is less important 
for local media in crisis regions (see above) and recommending that, here, one should rather invest in rela-
tionship-building with (local) media and journalists (GE a). 
Convincing media governance should consider that evidence provision needs good packaging (particularly 
academic/scientific evidence): It needs to be specifically tailored for local, national and international jour-
nalists and needs to be professionally shaped to different journalists’ and media’s needs and constraints 
(for instance, different news values/factors, storytelling (see further below), the provision of visuals or nar-
ratives, the provision of sources that can be consulted by individual journalists, etc.) (GE f).  
 
(2) SENSITIVITY TO CONFLICT(S) AND CULTURE(S) (GE C) 
In a multinational context, successfully planned and implemented media relations governance must be sen-
sitive to a conflict, the culture and the particular (geopolitical) context (GE c): Conveying messages and 
contents to international (mass) media and political decision-makers outside of the conflict and crisis region 
must be done in ways that are sensitive to the respective conflict and culture. In particular, when providing 
analytical judgement and/or recommendations for problem-solving (beyond factual reporting), NGOs and 
political actors must be aware that this could be –– in a particular conflict context –– counter-productive 
(escalative effect). For instance, in cases of human rights abuses to call prematurely for referral to the In-
ternational Criminal Court of political or military leaders can make those actors more desperate and less 
willing to compromise or to negotiate, since they see no way out. Particularly from a short-term perspec-
tive, such a recommendation can be counter-productive in preventing an escalation 19 of conflict, although 
                                                          
18 Kinniburgh & Denning (2006). Blogs and military information strategy. JSOU report 5-6, June. Publication of Joint Information 
Operations University. Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press. Available online at http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/jsou/blog-
book06june.pdf (retrieved 30.11.2016) 
19 For INFOCORE’s definition of ‘(de-)escalation’ see http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/def_escalation-de-
escalation.pdf  
“External cooperation, coordination and co-
herence:  
NGOs   Implementing communicative evi-
dence networks through: 
▪ inter-organisational cooperation, coordina-
tion and coherence among NGOs (on the ba-
sis of shared norms, values and/or interests)  
▪ extra-organisational cooperation with con-
tinual involvement and integration of NGOs’ 
local partners and actors (on the basis of com-
mon norms, values and/or interests).”  
 
“NGOs & Political actors: 
(1) Close cooperation with academics/scientists 
(for instance, via regular joint round-tables). 
(2) Specific packaging and tailoring of messages 
for various target groups and different journal-
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an ICC referral may well be appropriate or just. In this case, being sensitive to a conflict and culture means 
carefully considering particular conflict dynamics when planning communicative messages. From a commu-
nicator’s perspective, the strategy might be to achieve 
justice for the victims and media resonance for himself 
or herself. It might be well intentioned, but with re-
spect to the conflict development (de-escalation), it 
might be a better strategy to show restraint, owing to 
the particularly sensitive context of a conflict and its 
dynamics. It’s the stability vs. justice dilemma. Research findings from INFOCORE’s WP4 (Christoph Meyer) 
confirm this based on the results of in-depth interviews with NGO representatives. 
Sensitivity to a conflict and culture is even more critical when conveying messages and contents to local 
(mass) media in conflict and crisis regions. For this, especially locally active NGOs can work to support and 
consult with other NGOs and political actors outside the conflict region, on condition that they are truly fa-
miliar with the particularities of the various local media and public culture concerning the media system, 
journalistic aspects, norms and values; for instance by conducting media monitoring (GE b1). Usually, NGOs 
in the field of media assistance have this kind of knowledge. We recommend establishing various (local) 
expert teams for conflict-sensitive and culture-sensitive media relations –– if possible in the affected cri-
sis regions –– that can operate as consultants on the ground for others, but also with regard to (external) 
international media relations. For this, cooperation networks can be used to conserve resources when act-
ing. The work of such expert teams, which –– in turn –– advise other NGOs and political actors (on the 
basics of the principles of cooperation, coordination and coherence and on the basis of shared norms, val-
ues and/or interests), can also be useful with a view to the EU’s international efforts to counter propa-
ganda and disinformation or the Strategic Communication Division (‘StratComs’).  
 
(3) THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM 
Every form of (strategic) media relations and persuasive communication first has the ‘stigma of unreliabil-
ity’ and a presumed ‘natural lack of evidence’. Various (political) actors’ efforts to draw media attention 
are almost always suspected of hiding other interests not related to the topic at hand. Good media rela-
tions governance based on norms and values must confront this problem of legitimacy (GE c): Media gov-
ernance seeks to manage public opinion by effectively steering published opinions (in the crisis regions, in-
ternationally (public diplomacy) or in their various home countries). Thus, such measures can meet re-
sistance and generally risk causing a backlash. From the perspective of democracy theory, media relations 
are legitimate for the purpose of advancing particular interests. 
This is true in particular in liberal scenarios with guaranteed press freedom, since in these cases the journal-
ists take the final decisions about accepting or rejecting communication input from institutionalised 
sources. Socially, and from the perspective of professional journalism, any attempts to influence the media 
–– including media relations –– are sometimes considered problematic because they are attempts on the 
part of particular interests to influence the media. Thus, it is not advisable to deny or relativise the strategic 
and persuasive character of self-descriptions and self-communica-
tion. Journalists are well aware of this. We recommend that NGOs 
and political actors put their cards on the table and use values and 
norms to develop an awareness of the problems of the legitimacy 
of persuasive media relations and strategic communications.  
A good conceptualisation of media relations governance strategi-
cally implements this problem awareness and recognises the legiti-
macy of the accusation that persuasive media-related communica-
tion represents a form of interference in and influence of media 
content production. That is, good media relations governance that 
“When providing analytical judgement and/or 
recommendations for problem-solving, de-es-
calative communication must be particularly 
sensitive to a conflict, culture and context.” 
“Put your cards on the table: 
Good media relations govern-
ance (based on shared norms 
and values) acknowledges that 
every form of (strategic) media 
relations and persuasive commu-
nication has a stigma of unrelia-
bility and a presumed natural 
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accepts and anticipates this general scepticism prob-
lem – for instance, by setting a mission statement in 
the regulatory framework of media relations govern-
ance and requiring regular training sessions on this 
topic for the media relations team. Good media rela-
tions governance also anticipates that good journalists 
behave towards their sources with the appropriate de-
tachment. This is a sign of professionalism, not of hos-
tility or adverseness. 
 
(4) CROSS-MEDIAL NEWS DESKS/NEWSROOMS  
In the last 10 years, modern journalism has changed drastically. Effective media relations governance con-
siders that journalists now work across more areas and for more (different) media types (multichannel or 
cross-media principle) than before, that they are creating more content with the same budget (media re-
source scarcity) and that they are therefore shifting towards shorter stories. The division of work focused 
on target groups, editorial departments and channels (‘silo’) has lost its importance in many media. In-
stead, in many places, the so-called news desk or newsroom concept (open plan) has been introduced –– 
a concept to which strategic media relations must adapt (adaptation to the logic of journalistic produc-
tion processes) and that also offers many benefits to the performance of communication departments 
(GE d, f). At its core, this concept has a topic-centred approach focused on many channels and stakehold-
ers, and it has replaced the editor-centred approach. Content is now produced for multiple media types 
(including social media), which means that strategic communicators should also plan and set their agendas 
in cross-medial ways. This also allows media relations to better link the content of their media relations in-
ternally and externally as well as nationally and internationally.  
This is even more important because, in an ideal 
case, everyone in the team should be able to pro-
vide reliable information to media inquiries –– for 
instance, anyone in the media relations team 
should be able to answer questions about all pro-
jects, countries and topics. For this to work, a pro-
ject management system/software must be intro-
duced, for instance, a social intranet in which 
workflows, tasks, topics, work being done on 
them, timeframes, communications to the media, 
etc. can be viewed (worldwide) by all staff mem-
bers. This enables topics across the globe to be 
better identified, coordinated, specifically tailored 
and possibly even amplified; also, global coopera-
tion becomes closer, the exchange among teams 
and their reaction times become shorter and inter-
nal transparency increases.  
Particular challenges of the news desk/newsroom 
principle are: Staff must be knowledgeable about 
various topics, requirements of texts and narratives from different topic areas, different media, and their 
various production methods. In a global/international/transnational environment, foreign language profi-
ciency must be at a native level combined with journalistic skills, conflict-sensitive and culture-sensitive 
knowledge about the various journalistic target groups, detailed knowledge of the conflicts, etc. This de-
tailed knowledge must be at least as good as that of the journalistic target group; ideally, it goes (well) be-
yond that. Multinational teams in the newsrooms of strategic communicators are absolutely essential. As 
an alternative, external expertise must be bought on a case-by-case basis, or agencies must be used. 
Whether the large investment sums needed for this can be found is something that each communicator – 
whether an NGO or political actor – must decide for themselves.  
 
“Good media relations governance 
(based on shared norms and values) an-
ticipates the general scepticism problem 
and journalists’ duty of professional de-
tachment – for instance, by setting a mis-
sion statement in its regulatory frame-
work and requiring regular training on 
this topic for the media relations team.” 
“1. Adaptation to the logic of journalistic produc-
tion processes 
2. NGOs’ and political actors’ communication de-
partments can benefit from the introduction of the 
newsdesk/newsroom principle:  
► Topic-centred approach instead of editor-cen-
tred approach 
► Focus on many channels/media types and vari-
ous stakeholders 
►Strategic agenda-setting in cross-medial ways 
►Linking the content of media relations internally, 
externally, nationally and internationally 
► Enables topics across the globe to be better 
identified, coordinated and tailored 
►Amplified, global cooperation becomes closer; 
the exchange among teams and their reaction 
times become shorter 
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(5) STORYTELLING AND NARRATIVES 
The survey findings from INFOCORE Work Package 1 (’Journalism’) show that, contrary to generally held 
beliefs, journalists do not take ‘facts’ and then develop and write news and reports from them, but often 
already have a narrative in mind that they then support 
with appropriate evidence (that is, facts) and rhetoric. 
This applies less to immediate reporting in the context of 
rapid, acute and definite (escalative) events of violence 
and aggression than to journalistic production beyond 
such ‘hot’ short-term events. WP1 summarises this under 
the motto ‘The story comes first’: journalists already 
have a rough idea of the planned story, select information on the basis of the story frame, and keep search-
ing for sources that back their story. Furthermore, the phase beyond ‘hot’ short-term events is character-
ized by so called ‘media fatigue’. It means that the quantity of war coverage declines as a conflict evolves 
because journalists’ (and audiences’) interest in the issue more and more diminishes. This can also lead to a 
‘compassion fatigue’20 which is a problem in particular for NGOs (fundraising). A ‘compassion fatigue’ of the 
general public can also cause severe problems for political actors who for instance need public support for 
specific peace keeping actions or other relevant political decisions in the context of conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. Thus, successful media relations, information and messages intended for 
media should rely on storytelling 21 (GE f), which means that a logical narrative is developed and offered 
to journalists. A news desk team should be able to tailor narratives and stories for different target 
groups/media types/cultures (cross-medial/multichannel storytelling). Producing input for media accord-
ing to the principle ‘facts first’ –– ‘hard facts speak for themselves’ is not enough –– although this is the 
strategy during rapid acute and definite escalative short-term events of violence. In other words, if you 
want to convey facts, you first and foremost need an adequate narrative around these facts; then you add 
the facts into the narrative. Not the other way around. 
Talking of ‘facts’: In the results section of the Intro-
duction, we touched on ‘uncertainty’. To communi-
cate an evidence-based yet uncertain claim while pro-
actively admitting its uncertainty is considered to be 
a persuasive strength and contributes to a communi-
cator’s general credibility and to his or her role as 
expert (GE e). Further, to admit uncertainty is critical 
in the context of war and armed conflict and in the 
context of today’s post-factual or post-truth era. To 
admit uncertainty also distinguishes credible infor-
mation from propaganda (propaganda usually does 
not admit to uncertainty). Here, NGOs and political 
actors/entities can improve the factual basis and character of their communication on war and armed con-
flict by admitting uncertainty where it exists. In doing so, they avoid the impression that they somehow 
deal with factoids. Thus, we advise always admitting uncertainty where it exists. This particularly applies 
to the practice of storytelling, which often is misunderstood as a communicative technique that does not 
allow for uncertainty. 
  
                                                          
20 Moeller, S. D. (1999). Compassion fatigue: How the media sell disease, famine, war, and death. New York, NY: Routledge. 
21 Elmer (2011). Public relations and storytelling. In Edwards & Hodges (eds.), Public relations, society and culture (pp. 47-60). Lon-
don, New York. Routledge. 
 
“Good media relations governance (based 
on shared norms and values) anticipates 
that information and messages intended 
for media should rely on culture-sensitive 
and media-sensitive storytelling.” 
“Good media relations governance (based on 
shared norms and values) realises that storytell-
ing (like every other form of media-related and 
public communication) includes admitting un-
certainty where it exists. To proactively admit to 
uncertainty is considered a persuasive strength 
rather than a weakness and contributes to a 
communicator’s general credibility and to his or 
her role as expert role, particularly in today’s 
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(6) CONSIDERATION OF GENDER-SENSITIVE/GENDER-RELATED INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
Our findings revealed that female voices in strategic communication texts are extremely underrepresented 
in our African conflict cases: Burundi and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo. The extreme underrepresentation of 
women’s interests in strategic discourses in and about these 
two crisis cases also applies to texts of strategic communica-
tors with EU provenance. The marginalisation of voices and 
perspectives of African women in media-related and public 
communication is a problem in the context of war and 
armed conflict. Political actors (particularly those of EU 
origin) and NGOs active in conflict prevention, management 
and resolution (particularly in Africa) should increase aware-
ness of the problem of women’s underrepresentation in 
public discourse on war and armed conflict. They should use 
their role as media sources and should enhance female rep-
resentation in media coverage by offering journalists (gender-related and/or gender-sensitive) information. 
This can often only be achieved through intense investigation beyond the usual (male-dominated) main-
stream (for instance, using specialised women networks, specialised NGOs or expert databanks). Good me-
dia relations governance incorporates a gender-sensitive approach into its portfolio of shared norms and 
values (GE c, f). Good media relations governance also considers that a misguided notion of gender-sensi-
tive communication can lead to (undesirable and risky) appeals for the protection and sheltering of 
women in times of violent conflict. These notions can serve as a political or humanitarian justification for 
military intervention and war (escalation).22 This is why researchers criticise this gendered notion as a mas-
culine, authoritarian idea.  
 
(7) PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING BOTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Today, a high share of social media content stems from so-called ‘bots’ – automated accounts (computer 
programs) that produce automated Twitter or other social media content. Experts estimate that 30 million 
Twitter accounts do not represent real people/institutions but are automated accounts; Facebook assumes 
that its platform has 15 million automated fake accounts. 
“Bots (…) silence people and groups who might otherwise 
have a stake in a conversation. At the same time they make 
some users seem more popular, they make others less likely 
to speak. This spiral of silence results in less discussion and 
diversity in politics. Moreover, bots used to attack journal-
ists might cause them to stop reporting on important issues because they fear retribution and harass-
ment.” 23 It might be as sign of best practice (GE d) if strategic communicators in conflict prevention, man-
agement and resolution proactively assert that they completely abstain from bots (and abide by this as-
surance). This can contribute to their general reliability and credibility (GE e). Good media relations gov-
ernance proactively and explicitly incorporates the deliberate eschewal of bots into its portfolio of 





                                                          
22 Fröhlich (2016); see footnote 11. 
23 How Twitter bots are shaping the election. The Atlantic, 1 November 2016  http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ar-
chive/2016/11/election-bots/506072/  
“Good media relations governance incor-
porates a gender-sensitive approach into 
its portfolio of shared norms and values. 
It is also conscious of the risk that gen-
der-sensitive communication can lead to 
(undesirable and risky) appeals for the 
protection and sheltering of women in 
times of violent conflict. These notions 
can serve as a political or humanitarian 
justification for military intervention and 
war (escalation).”  
“A Good media relations governance 
principle pro-actively incorporates the de-
liberate eschewal of bots into its portfolio 
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Our suggestions in this policy brief are primarily based on the quantitative findings from INFOCORE’s WP6. 
We have analysed what and how information is provided and advocated by strategic communicators and 
what parts of this information are taken up and disseminated by the media. The findings we have gener-
ated based on this approach allow us to recommend suitable strategies for effectively communicating to 
different media (local, national, international, print, online, electronic) during conflicts.  
We took the understanding of ‘evidence’ as a key performance criterion of the accuracy and trustworthi-
ness of conflict communication (see above) and combined it with key performance criteria described in nor-
mative PR theory as characteristic of excellent strategic communication/PR (e.g. Hon and Grunig, 1999; Seo 
et al. 2009)24. To make ‘evidence’ an indicator of strategic (media-related) communication’s quality, we fac-
tored in six relevant approaches from normative PR theory, from which we then derived two specific crite-
ria to measure evidence: 1) Via the construct ‘epistemic status’, we examined how certainty framing vs. un-
certainty framing was done in the analysed NGO PR texts. 2) With the construct ‘evidence’, we analysed the 
de facto provision of evidence of evidential claims (= transparency of the sources of evidential claims; refer-
ences as to where evidential claims stems from). Further, we conducted a special analysis of strategic com-
munication material/texts in which male and female experts are explicitly represented and discussed 
and/or which stem from them. The aim was to investigate the representation of women’s voices (com-
pared to those of men).  
Our study uses data from computer-assisted content analysis conducted with the help of JAmCAT 25 soft-
ware. Thus, we were able to examine a wide array of texts. The evidence-related content analysis is based 
on text material of 65 different NGOs (33 transnational, 32 local) and of 35 different political actors. Here, 
we decided to concentrate on NGOs and political actors (1) that are clearly engaged in our three conflict 
regions/six conflicts, (2) that have produced a significant amount of texts/communication material, and (3) 
whose texts have been distributed either in English, German or French. The gender-related analysis also 
focussed on texts distributed in English, French and German. They stem from about 260 different strategic 
communicators, including NGOs and political actors but also beyond these two groups. We constructed the 
samples (see Tables 1 to 3) based on extensive web research and in close collaboration with INFOCORE’s 
conflict experts,26 its associated stakeholder network27 and its advisory board.28 We included NGOs’ and 
political actors’ (and for the gender-related analysis, also other strategic communicators’) media-like com-
munication means and their official media releases provided in archives of their online press rooms. To 
compose the specific investigation periods (see Tables 1 to 3), we relied on the INFOCORE conflict experts 
and the conflict descriptions by the U.N., BBC and Timelines of History (http://timelines.ws). For the evi-
dence-related content analysis, we gathered 16,262 texts from NGOs and 18,888 from political actors. The 
gender-related analysis is based on 23,246 texts from diverse types of strategic communicators. We turned 
all the texts were turned into machine-readable data.29 The following tables provide an overview of the 
three samples of texts stemming from the public communication and media relations material of NGOs (Ta-
ble 1), from political actors (Table 2) and from all of WP6’s strategic communicators (Table 3). We analysed 
these texts (more than 85,000) by means of JAmCAT and Python scripts. 
 
  
                                                          
24 Hon & Grunig (1999). Guidelines for measuring relationships in public relations. Gainesville, FL: Institute for Public Relations. Seo 
& Yang (2009). Global activism and new media: A study of transnational NGOs’ online public relations. Public Relations Review 35: 
123–126. DOI:10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.02.002. 
25 http://jamcat.mscc.huji.ac.il/accounts/login/?next=/  
26 http://www.infocore.eu/expert-directory/  
27 http://www.infocore.eu/consortium/associated-stakeholder-network/  
28 http://www.infocore.eu/consortium/advisory-board/  
29 Owing to technical restrictions with the PDF format, we were unable to convert all texts into machine-readable data.  
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Table 1: Evidence-related content analysis: Overview of the applied sample of NGOs’ strategic communication ma-
terial and media relations texts 
Conflict cases 
NGO type 
Number of texts 
Investigation periods 
Great Lakes Region, Africa    
Burundi Local NGOs 669 2010 – 2014 
Burundi TnNGOs 257 
Democratic Republic of Congo Local NGOs 501 2012 – 2014 
Democratic Republic of Congo TnNGOs 1,529 
Western Balkans    
Kosovo Local NGOs 235 2010 – 2014 
Kosovo TnNGOs 293 
Macedonia Local NGOs 188 2011 – 2014 
Macedonia TnNGOs 33 
Middle East    
Israel/Palestine Local NGOs 4,260 2006 – 2014 
Israel/Palestine TnNGOs 3,092 
Syria Local NGOs 3,798 2011 – 2014 
Syria TnNGOs 1,407 
Total Local NGOs 9,651  
Total TnNGOs 6,611 
N  16,262 
 
 
Table 2: Evidence-related content analysis: Overview of the applied sample of political actors’ strategic communica-
tion material and media relations texts 
Conflict Cases 
Type of NGO 
type 
Number of texts 
Periods of Investigation 
Great Lakes Region, Africa 
   
Burundi Local 802 2010 – 2014 
Burundi International 71 
Democratic Republic of Congo Local 2,531 2012 – 2014 
Democratic Republic of Congo International 1,086 
Western Balkans   
  
Kosovo Local 2,696 2010 – 2014 
Kosovo International 1,573 
Macedonia Local 738 2011 – 2014 
Macedonia International 299 
Middle East   
  
Israel/Palestine Local 1,839 2006 – 2014 
Israel/Palestine International 3,868 
Syria Local 306 2011 – 2014 
Syria International 3,079 
Total Local 8,912   
Total International 9,976 
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Table 3: Gender-related content analysis: Overview of the applied sample of persuasive texts of the strategic com-
municators per conflict 
Conflict Cases Type of NGO Number of Texts Periods of Investigation 
Great Lakes Region Africa:    
Burundi Local NGOs 669 2010 – 2014 
Burundi TnNGOs 257 
Democratic Republic of Congo Local NGOs 501 2012 – 2014 
Democratic Republic of Congo TnNGOs 1,529 
Western Balkans:    
Kosovo Local NGOs 235 2010 – 2014 
Kosovo TnNGOs 293 
Macedonia Local NGOs 188 2011 – 2014 
Macedonia TnNGOs 33 
Middle East:    
Israel/Palestine Local NGOs 4,260 2006 – 2014 
Israel/Palestine TnNGOs 3,092 
Syria Local NGOs 3,798 2011 – 2014 
Syria TnNGOs 1,407 
Total Local NGOs 9,651  
Total TnNGOs 6,611 
N  16,262 
 
For the –– comparatively simple –– gender-related content analysis (Table 3), we analysed strategic texts 
stemming from male and female experts or in which they are explicitly represented/cited and/or discussed. 
These experts for instance represent well-known, important male and female professionals in their functions 
as members of organisations or institutions (NGOs, governments, political parties, etc.) but also prominent 
experts, important researchers, spokespersons or activists. They are known by name and were identified and 
nominated by the respective INFOCORE conflict leaders a priori for each of our six conflicts. In the research 
material, we identified them (and the text passages that refer to them) by using their individual names as 
search terms. We compared the results to the given situation in the six conflicts –– the shares of male and 
female experts potentially available as sources.  
For the more complex evidence-related content analysis of the over 35,000 text of NGOs (Table 1) and polit-
ical actors (Table 2), we relied on a dictionary that operationalises around 3,800 different semantic concepts, 
each expressing semantic ideas such as actors, places, adjectives or actions. It connects each concept with 
expressions that indicate its application in a text in the different languages included in our research. This 
procedure enabled high comparability across different cases and languages. To examine how transparently 
the epistemic statuses of the provided evidential claims were communicated, we collected all semantic con-
cepts that express the ‘(un)certainty’ of a given piece of information. We created these two groups of epis-
temic statuses because the question of the justification of why something is certain (e.g. mentioning a relia-
ble source) or uncertain (e.g. conceding that concrete proof does not (yet) exist) arose. We consider this form 
of justification to be an indicator of the application of evidence.30 We then analysed the occurrence of the 
two groups of (semantic) concepts (certainty and uncertainty) in the different texts to calculate how often 
evidential claims were described with either kind of epistemic status. To match the two epistemic statuses 
to the different evidential claims and their respective topical domains, we determined with which of the 
other 3,800 different semantic concepts these epistemic statuses co-occur.31  
We identified the origins and sources of evidential claims with the help of a Python script that searched for 
specific expressions that signal that a claim is attributed to a source/origin. These expressions were then 
collected with the aid of an annotated corpus of sampled material. The reliability of this script was tested 
for false positives as well as false negatives for all three languages. All sentences that contained these ex-
pressions were extracted, along with an indicator that links the extracted sentences to the texts from which 
they stem. We subsequently applied the dictionary to identify who was mentioned as the ‘author’ of the 
                                                          
30 Expressions used to identify these concepts can be provided upon request.  
31 We regarded two concepts as ‘co-occurring’ if they appeared within 30 words from each other (the distance was reduced by syn-
tactical breaks such as commas, periods, line breaks). The degree to which two concepts co-occur was then calculated by their 
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evidential claim (person, institution), and what the ‘origins’ of claims (annual report, speech, research pa-
per, etc.) were. To analyse the resonance of strategic and media-related communication, we constructed a 
media sample based on the data from INFOCORE’s WP7: 9 international and 12 local media organisations 
(see footnotes 9 and 10). Table 4 provides an overview of the number of media texts/news/reports we ana-
lysed for each conflict. 
 
Table 4: Overview of the applied media sample  
Conflict Cases Type of NGO Number of Texts Periods of Investigation 
Great Lakes Region Africa:    
Burundi Local media 2,296 2010 – 2014 
Burundi International media 3,163 
Democratic Republic of Congo Local media 38,931 2012 – 2014 
Democratic Republic of Congo International media 8,780 
Western Balkans:    
Kosovo Local media 8,148 2010 – 2014 
Kosovo International media 6,215 
Macedonia Local media 12,854 2011 – 2014 
Macedonia International media 2,662 
Middle East:    
Israel/Palestine Local media 139,819 2006 – 2014 
Israel/Palestine International media 47,374 
Syria Local media 5,336 2011 – 2014 
Syria International media 74,285 
Total Local media 207,384  
Total International media 142,479 
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